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Qualitative
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Necessary Conditions,
and Limited Diversity:
Some Problematic
Consequences of
Schneider andWagemann’s
Enhanced Standard Analysis
Barry Cooper1 and Judith Glaesser1
Abstract
We discuss a recent development in the set theoretic analysis of data sets
characterized by limited diversity. Ragin, in developing his Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis (QCA), developed a standard analysis that produces par-
simonious, intermediate, and complex Boolean solutions of truth tables.
Schneider and Wagemann argue this standard analysis procedure is proble-
matic and develop an enhanced standard analysis (ESA). We show, by devel-
oping Schneider and Wagemann’s discussion of Stokke’s work on fisheries
conservation and by discussing a second illustrative truth table, that ESA has
problematic features. We consider how scholars might proceed in the face
of these problems, considering the relations between limited diversity and
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the different methods of reducing truth tables instantiated in Ragin’s QCA
and Baumgartner’s Coincidence Analysis.
Keywords
Qualitative Comparative Analysis, necessary conditions, limited diversity,
enhanced standard analysis, Coincidence Analysis
Introduction
We discuss problems embedded in Schneider and Wagemann’s (2012,
2013) proposed enhanced standard analysis (ESA) procedure for Quali-
tative Comparative Analysis (QCA). Developed by Ragin (1987, 2000,
2008), QCA is a configurational method that seeks nonredundant necessary
and sufficient conditions for an outcome. To establish the sufficiency of a
condition or a combination of conditions for some outcome, QCA assesses
whether the set of cases with the condition(s) is a subset of those with the
outcome. To establish necessity, it assesses whether the set of cases with
the outcome is a subset of those with the condition(s). Whether QCA estab-
lishes causal claims or, less ambitiously, provides complex descriptions
and/or predictions, continues to be debated (see, e.g., Cooper and Glaesser
2012a). Here, we put this question to one side.
Ragin has also developed methods for using QCA when sufficiency and
necessity might be only approximated to and for using counterfactual anal-
ysis to alleviate problems arising from limited diversity (2000, 2008). The
term ‘‘limited diversity’’ draws attention to a problem that commonly arises
in social research, especially when samples are small: The social world
often fails to supply information on all possible combinations of the puta-
tively causal factors picked out by configurational models.
QCA is widely used and there is an increasing demand for texts detailing
how it should be employed. An important addition to this literature is
Schneider and Wagemann (2012). This book encourages readers to follow
recommended procedures by using such subheadings as ‘‘Recipe for a Good
QCA,’’ by its claims concerning ‘‘ESA,’’ and through references to ‘‘best
practice’’ (e.g., ‘‘We add further strategies that go beyond the current best
practice approach’’ [p. 151]). These authors question QCA’s ‘‘standard
analysis’’ procedure (Ragin 2008) and develop ESA, claiming this offers
an improved procedure for coping with limited diversity (see also Schneider
and Wagemann 2013). We believe that ESA has problematic features and
that it is unsafe to follow ESA’s procedures without considering unintended
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perverse effects. This article, addressing crisp set QCA, discusses our
concerns.
‘‘Empirical necessary conditions’’ (ENCs) play a crucial role in Schnei-
der and Wagemann’s arguments and are a key focus here. Insofar as our
arguments are sound, as well as raising concerns about ESA, we hope to
convince readers that, at the current stage of development of set theoretic
methods, best practice recommendations are inherently risky. A less author-
itative tone might be more appropriate (Cooper and Glaesser 2011b).
We first discuss Ragin’s treatment of limited diversity, referring to
Stokke’s (2004, 2007) work. We then present problematic aspects of ESA,
initially discussing the application of ESA to Stokke’s data set and then to
an invented truth table. We then discuss the apparent sources of the prob-
lems we outline, ending with brief reflections on handling limited diversity
and issues needing further debate.
Ragin on Limited Diversity and Counterfactual Analysis:
Stokke’s Work
Ragin and Sonnett (2005) note that social phenomena are profoundly lim-
ited in their diversity, complicating social analysis. They, like Schneider
and Wagemann, discuss Stokke’s (2004, 2007) research on ‘‘shaming’’ as
a strategy for improving international regimes’ impact on resource manage-
ment. Stokke’s 10 cases involve cod stocks in the Barents Sea and the North
West Atlantic and Antarctic krill stocks in the southern ocean. Shaming
aims to expose fishing practices ‘‘to third parties whose opinion matters
to the intended target of shaming’’ (Stokke 2007:503). Stokke employs five
conditions likely to lead to successful shaming. These are summarized by
Ragin (2008:167):
1. Advice (A): Whether the shamers can substantiate their criticism
with reference to explicit recommendations of the regime’s scien-
tific advisory body.
2. Commitment (C): Whether the target behavior explicitly violates a
conservation measure adopted by the regime’s decision-making
body.
3. Shadow of the future (S): Perceived need of the target of shaming to
strike new deals under the regime—such beneficial deals are likely
to be jeopardized if criticism is ignored.
4. Inconvenience (I): The inconvenience (to the target of shaming) of
the behavioral change that the shamers are trying to prompt.
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5. Reverberation (R): The domestic political costs to the target of
shaming for not complying.
Stokke’s 10 cases of shaming are set out in Table 1. In such truth tables, a
1 is used to indicate the presence of a condition or of the outcome, and a 0
their absence. We have added a column to show the absence of the outcome,
*SUCCESS (* indicates negation).
With five conditions, a fully populated truth table has 25 or 32 rows.
Table 1 therefore includes eight of 32 possible configurations. The unsim-
plified solution for sufficiency, using only the empirical information, and
where each term represents the combination of one of the conditions or their
absence, and the þ indicates logical OR, is (Stokke 2007):
ðA*CSIRÞ þ ðACSIRÞ þ ðACS*I*RÞ þ ðA*C*S*I*RÞ
<¼> SUCCESS: ð1Þ
This can be reduced, by Boolean minimization of the first two terms,
since the presence or absence of C makes no difference here, to the
‘‘complex’’ solution that is reported by fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (fsQCA; Ragin et al. 2006, version 2.5):
ðASIRÞ þ ðACS*I*RÞ þ ðA*C*S*I*RÞ <¼> SUCCESS: ð2Þ
Stokke also lists alternative solutions that depend on different simplify-
ing assumptions (SAs) being made about ‘‘logical remainders’’ (missing
rows). SAs allow more parsimonious solutions, by allocating the outcome
or its absence to all or some remainder rows. Ragin (2008) notes that the
complex solution shown in equation 2 effectively sets all the remainders
to ‘‘false’’ (i.e., assumes that, were the missing configurations to exist, they
Table 1. Truth Table (Stokke 2007).
A C S I R SUCCESS *SUCCESS n
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
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would have the outcome*SUCCESS). Ragin also derives a parsimonious
solution, allowing the fsQCA software to allocate either SUCCESS or
*SUCCESS to each remainder row guided purely by the desire to reduce
the number of causal conditions in the solution. Ragin argues that, in gen-
eral, neither of these two extreme options seems attractive. The complex
solution may be needlessly complex, insofar as it does not use available
easy counterfactual SAs, while a parsimonious solution may be ‘‘unrealis-
tically parsimonious due to the incorporation of difficult counterfactuals’’
(Ragin 2008:163). FsQCA’s parsimonious solution is:
*Iþ SR <¼> SUCCESS: ð3Þ
There is actually another parsimonious solution available if fsQCA’s
focus on minimal sum models—which aim to minimize the number of
prime implicants required to cover the outcome—is dropped (Thiem
2014), but it is one that the literature treated here does not discuss, and we
shall therefore only note it in passing: *I þ CR þ *CS <¼> SUCCESS.
Ragin explains that the complex and parsimonious solutions can be seen as
end points of a range of solutions that stand in subset or superset relations
with one another. Considering just those configurations that have the out-
come SUCCESS, the complex solution (equation 2) is a subset of the parsi-
monious solution (equation 3) since the parsimonious solution includes all of
the rows from the complex solution plus additional remainder rows that have
been allocated the solution counterfactually.
Ragin notes that other solutions along the complexity/parsimony conti-
nuum are possible. Such intermediate solutions are determined by which
subsets of the remainders allocated the outcome in generating the parsimo-
nious solution are incorporated in this revised solution (Ragin 2008:165).
As he explains, any available intermediate solutions, given the way they are
generated, must be supersets of the complex solution and subsets of the par-
simonious solution. Which, if any, of the logically available intermediate
solutions is to be preferred to the complex solution hinges on decisions
about easy and hard counterfactuals (i.e., about which remainders should
be incorporated into the intermediate solution).
Ragin (2008:168–71) uses counterfactual reasoning to determine which
remainders should be incorporated. For example, he decides, looking at the
term ASIR in equation 2, that AS* IR would also be likely to produce suc-
cessful shaming, since ‘‘the fact that it is inconvenient (I) for the targets of
shaming to change their behavior does not promote successful shaming.’’
Condition I, therefore, can be dropped from ASIR by allocating the remain-
der AS* IR the outcome and minimizing these two to ASR, since whether
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we have I or*I makes no difference to the outcome. By using such reason-
ing, while also requiring that any term in the intermediate solution must
contain the conditions specified in the term of the parsimonious solution
of which it is a subset, Ragin (2008:165–66) produces the intermediate solu-
tion:
ðA*IÞ þ ðASRÞ <¼> SUCCESS: ð4Þ
Ragin argues that researchers too often incorporate as many SAs as pos-
sible or avoid them altogether, while a better approach would be to ‘‘strike a
balance between complexity and parsimony, using substantive and theore-
tical knowledge to conduct thought experiments’’ to achieve an optimal
intermediate solution (2008:172). Importantly, the fsQCA software, as part
of its standard analysis, makes available the three solutions. To generate an
intermediate solution, the researcher is asked to choose whether, for each
condition, the condition should be assumed to contribute to the outcome
when present, when absent, or when ‘‘present or absent.’’
Comparing equations 3 and 4, we can see that the intermediate solution,
unlike the parsimonious solution, includes the condition A in each term.
Schneider and Wagemann (2012) term condition A an ‘‘ENC’’ since, in
Table 1, SUCCESS never occurs without A being present. The fact that
A is missing from the parsimonious solution is one motivation for their
development of ESA. Ragin (2000:105:254) also noted that parsimonious
solutions of limitedly diverse truth tables can omit possible necessary con-
ditions. He proposed separate tests of necessity and, subject to careful
reflection on ‘‘theory, substantive knowledge, and auxiliary empirical evi-
dence,’’ the reinsertion of missed necessary conditions into solutions. Ragin
and Sonnett (2005) wrote, discussing Stokke’s data set: ‘‘Notice . . . that all
four causal combinations . . . linked to successful shaming include the
presence of A,’’ adding: ‘‘This commonality, which could be a necessary
condition for successful shaming, would not escape the attention of . . . a
case-oriented researcher.’’ Stokke argued that the data at hand are compa-
tible with A being a necessary condition (2007:507). Ragin (2008:171)
notes that Stokke (2004) includes A in his results, adding A back into equa-
tion 3 to give equation 4, having tested for its necessity prior to undertaking
sufficiency tests. We now turn to ESA.
Schneider and Wagemann on Stokke’s Work
Schneider and Wagemann (2012, 2013) argue that fsQCA’s standard anal-
ysis has weaknesses, claiming it can yield solution formulas that are based
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on ‘‘untenable counterfactual claims’’ (2012:167). When the user chooses
parsimony as the criterion for selecting eligible remainders, ‘‘impossible
remainders’’ can be selected, leading to ‘‘untenable assumptions’’ (p. 176).
In addition, some unconsidered remainders might actually have provided
grounds for good counterfactual claims (p. 177). They also argue that ‘‘inco-
herent counterfactuals’’ can be used in solutions if the implications of previ-
ously derived statements about necessary conditions for the outcome are
ignored.
There is much of interest in their discussion of these problems. Here, how-
ever, we concentrate on problems arising from the use they make of ‘‘ENCs’’
in both their critical arguments about the standard analysis and in developing
ESA. We develop our arguments through focusing on one of two claims
Schneider and Wagemann (2012) make concerning the reasons why neces-
sary conditions may become ‘‘hidden’’ in fsQCA-based analyses of suffi-
ciency. They describe ‘‘the disappearance of true necessary conditions’’ as
a fallacy that can arise ‘‘due to two, mutually nonexclusive features of the
data at hand’’ (p. 221). These are (1) hidden necessary conditions due to inco-
herent counterfactuals and (2) hidden necessary conditions due to inconsis-
tent truth table rows. They discuss the first with reference to Stokke’s
(2007) data set and the second using invented data. Here we discuss just
(1). For a critical discussion of (2), see Cooper and Glaesser (2015).
Schneider and Wagemann (2012:222) note that fsQCA’s parsimonious
solution of Stokke’s truth table (Table 1) is ‘‘*I þ SR ¼> SUCCESS’’
(equation 3 re sufficiency). They argue that one might conclude that no con-
dition is necessary, since none appears in both paths. But, the truth table
‘‘reveals, condition ADVICE (A) is present in all instances of successful
shaming. It therefore empirically qualifies as a necessary condition.’’ The
word ‘‘empirically’’ is important here, as we shall show, but first we sum-
marize Schneider and Wagemann’s argument concerning this ‘‘hidden nec-
essary condition.’’ They argue it has disappeared because of the treatment
of remainders by fsQCA. They set out 16 remainders that are allocated the
outcome, SUCCESS, to obtain the parsimonious solution (equation 3). Sim-
plified, they are (Schneider and Wagemann 2012:223):
*A*Cð*S*I*R þ*S*IR þ S*I*R þ S*IR þ SIRÞþ
*ACð*S*I*R þ*S*IR þ S*I*R þ S*IR þ SIRÞþ
A*Cð*S*IR þ S*I*R þ S*IRÞþ
ACð*S*I*R þ*S*IR þ S*IRÞ:
Schneider and Wagemann (2012) note that 10 include the absence of A,
adding: ‘‘It is because of these incoherent assumptions that the necessary
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condition A is deemed logically redundant and is minimized away from the
parsimonious solution term’’ (p. 223). For illustration, they note that truth table
row 2,A*C* S* I*R, after beingmatched with the remainder*A*
C* S* I* R, becomes*C* S* I* R. After further minimizations
involving this new term and its descendants, we eventually obtain the claim
*I ¼> SUCCESS. They note that ‘‘every single combination containing
*I either empirically implies the outcome or is assumed to imply it, regardless
of whether it logically contradicts the statement that A is necessary for SUC-
CESS.’’ The disappearance of necessary conditions is ‘‘caused by wrong-
headed assumptions about logical remainders.’’ They argue that any SA that
combines*A with SUCCESS, since it contradicts A’s being an ENC, is an
‘‘incoherent counterfactual’’ (Schneider and Wagemann 2012:223).
Their solution to this problem is ‘‘straightforward: do not make any such
incoherent assumptions’’ (pp. 223–24). In their ‘‘enhanced most parsimo-
nious solution,’’ no use is made of ‘‘remainders containing the absence of the
necessary condition’’ (p. 224). They proceed to apply this constraint. This
produces the solution ‘‘A* I þ ASR ¼> SUCCESS’’ (equation 4 re suffi-
ciency). Here the ‘‘necessary’’ condition A appears in all terms. As part of
ESA, one should undertake analyses of necessity prior to those of sufficiency.
The danger of hidden necessary conditions can then be avoided.
The question arises of the safety of their approach. There does seem to be a
problem. They make use of the empirical necessity of A for SUCCESS, argu-
ing that this implies*A should only appear with*SUCCESS, as it indeed
does in Table 1 (note, though, that we only have one of the 16 logically pos-
sible rows including*A available). However, there are other ENCs in Table
1 (e.g., condition I is necessary for*SUCCESS, the absence of SUCCESS).
This statement is logically equivalent to the statement that*I is sufficient for
SUCCESS and, indeed, looking at the two rows we have containing*I (of
the 16 that are logically possible), these are associated with SUCCESS.
This opens up a critical line of argument, one drawing on their favored
criterion of ‘‘incoherence.’’ Condition I being empirically necessary for
*SUCCESS implies *I is sufficient for SUCCESS. Their ESA-derived
solution for SUCCESS (see equation 4 re sufficiency) does not, however,
include*I as a stand-alone condition. Yet, we have derived*I being suf-
ficient from an empirical claim about Table 1 in exactly the same way as they
derived their claim that *A should be sufficient for *SUCCESS. Also,
whenever*I appears in Table 1, so does SUCCESS. This is problematic.
There is another worrying consequence of ESA. Schneider and Wage-
mann say we should draw conclusions concerning remainders from condition
A being empirically necessary for success, given it follows that *A is
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sufficient for *SUCCESS. Also in Table 1, I is empirically necessary for
*SUCCESS, implying that*I is sufficient for SUCCESS. We have then:
*A is sufficient for *SUCCESS (statement 1)
*I is sufficient for SUCCESS (statement 2)
Now consider, as an example, the remainder *ACS * IR, a subset of
both *A and *I. Statement 1 says it must have the negated outcome.
Statement 2 says it must have the outcome. Previously (Cooper et al.
2014), we referred to this as a contradiction. One reviewer of an earlier ver-
sion of this article pointed out that this was too strong a claim. Statements 1
and 2 will, in fact, not lead to a contradiction as long as we rule out the exis-
tence of any configurations that include*A and*I together. For it to be
possible for statements 1 and 2 to be simultaneously true,*A and*I can-
not appear together. Our double use of ESA generates, on the basis of the
given data, the strong claim that, if we are to avoid a contradiction, then
configurations including*A * I cannot exist.
Now, certainly there is no row with *A * I in Table 1. However, to
avoid a contradiction arising, we are asked to accept that there can be no
empirical cases in which a shamer cannot substantiate their criticism of a
regime by reference to the regime’s science advisers and in which, at the
same time, it would not be inconvenient to make the changes wanted by the
shamers. This isn’t, for us, an obviously impossible combination, but whether
it is justified or not to make this existence claim would require counterfactual
debate between experts in the politics of environmental protection.
In general, Schneider and Wagemann (2012:217) recommend such
theory-guided counterfactual reasoning (e.g., as part of their ‘‘theory-guided
enhanced standard analysis’’ [TESA]), arguing that logical remainders
should be considered as candidate ‘‘good counterfactuals,’’ after ‘‘careful
theoretical thinking,’’ irrespective of whether they contribute to parsimony.
There is some tension apparent here between ESA and TESA. The irony here
is that our double use of ESA, if we are to avoid a contradiction between
statements 1 and 2, must rule out—algorithmically—any counterfactual
discussion of eight ‘‘missing’’ configurations (those involving *A * I)
since the ENCs imply their nonexistence. ESA makes claims about the
nonexistence of missing configurations, on the basis of the given ENCs.
We have raised concerns about ESA, by exploring its application to
Stokke’s data. ESA’s solution for SUCCESS did not include I alone,
although its own arguments applied to a second ENC would have led to this
result. In addition, ESA, to avoid contradictions, must rule out the existence
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of some configurations mechanically, although its authors favor theoretical
reasoning about such decisions. In the next section, we explore these con-
cerns further, drawing on the analysis of an invented truth table. This will
allow us to clarify where ESA’s problems lie.
Can ESA Defeat Itself?
In this section, to clarify the problems to which ESA can lead, we will revi-
sit the problems discussed above but in the context of a simpler truth table.
We want to show that, for this truth table, ESA has self-defeating qualities,
at least when employing the Quine–McCluskey (QM) minimization algo-
rithm. The truth table is Table 2.
We can see that, empirically, there are two necessary conditions here:
A is necessary for Y (statement 3)
*B is necessary for *Y (statement 4)
These are logically equivalent to and therefore imply:
*A is sufficient for *Y (statement 5)
B is sufficient for Y (statement 6)
We can again apply ESA twice. Statement 3 rules out rows 3 and 4 being
used as SAs for Y. Statement 4 rules out their being used as SAs for*Y.
The prioritizing of the ENCs leads to the ruling out of rows 3 and 4 as usable
SAs. The result is that, on the basis of ESA’s reasoning from ENCs, we
must assume that we have only the given six rows to minimize, without any
access to SAs. If we employ fsQCA but are constrained not to use rows 3
and 4 as SAs, we obtain these solutions:
Table 2. An Invented Truth Table.
Row A B C Y *Y
1 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 0 1 0 1
3 0 1 0 ? ?
4 0 1 1 ? ?
5 1 0 0 0 1
6 1 0 1 1 0
7 1 1 0 1 0
8 1 1 1 1 0
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For Y: AC þ AB <¼> Y (statement 7).
For*Y: *A * B þ*B* C <¼> *Y (statement 8).
Statement 6, derived from an ENC, says that B is sufficient for Y. B does
not, however, appear as a stand-alone term in statement 7. Statement 5 says
*A is sufficient for*Y, but*A does not appear alone in statement 8. The
problem here is that the QM algorithm instantiated in fsQCA cannot deliver
the sufficiency results in statements 5 and 6 unless it has access to the logical
remainders (rows 3 and 4) that ESA has ruled out. For Table 2, the combina-
tion of ENCs, ESA, and fsQCA leads to the problematic claim that statement
7 is the solution for Y, even though it doesn’t include B as a single factor as
required by statement 6.We have shown here that ESA, employing QMmini-
mization, in the case of Table 2, is self-defeating. ESA rules out the use of
rows 3 and 4 but, without these being available as SAs, it has no way of deli-
vering statements 5 and 6, but 5 and 6 are logically required by its own ENCs.
It is worth noting that, had we not used ESA to rule out rows 3 and 4 as
SAs, then fsQCA would have delivered these parsimonious solutions:
AC þ B <¼> Y (statement 9)
*A þ*B*C <¼> *Y (statement 10)
Here, we have the two single factors. However, given the use of the QM
algorithm, these two solutions require the use of contradictory SAs. To obtain
statement 9, we must set rows 3 and 4 to have the outcome Y. To obtain state-
ment 10, we must set these to have the outcome *Y. An alternative
approach, Baumgartner’s (2015) Coincidence Analysis (CNA), drops the
QM algorithm, with its one-difference restriction (by which phrase Baum-
gartner refers to the QM algorithm’s search for rows that share the outcome
and differ only in one of the condition columns of the truth table). The focus
of CNA is merely on the truth table itself (though this might comprise the
configurations and their outcomes given in the empirical data or these plus
configurations and outcomes introduced after theoretically informed counter-
factual reasoning but before minimization). At the point the table is mini-
mized, no SAs are introduced. The crucial point is that they are not
needed, since the algorithm employed to minimize the truth table does not,
as in the case of QM, need rows that differ on just one condition in order
to move forward through the minimization procedure. As Baumgartner
(2015:14–15) notes, ‘‘CNA infers causal dependencies not only from the con-
figurations actually contained in truth tables (as does QCA) but also from the
fact that certain configurations are not contained therein.’’ In Table 2, for
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example, whenever B appears Y does. Nothing in the table contradicts the
claim that given B, we see Y. Similarly, nothing contradicts the observation
*A is sufficient for*Y. CNA therefore delivers the solutions in statements
9 and 10 simply by minimizing, using its own algorithm, the given rows.
Discussion
What underlies the problems discussed in the previous two sections? We
have seen that ESA makes claims about ENCs and uses these in its proce-
dures for vetting candidate SAs. Now, if we assume that the given data are
complete (i.e., that the configurations and associated outcomes in the given
truth table fully represent the relevant population for our analyses), then
these necessity claims can be regarded as secure. In the case of Stokke’s
table, for example, we could safely assume that there are no missing config-
urations waiting to be found that will have the outcome SUCCESS without
A or*SUCCESS without I. However, if we make this assumption, then it
becomes less clear that we should use any SAs given that we have effec-
tively assumed the nonexistence of all remainders. If we do not assume the
data are complete, then the assumption that ENCs represent true necessary
conditions, as we have shown, can produce problems.
The QM algorithm encourages scholars to find candidate SAs among
remainders because of its one-difference requirement. Without access to SAs,
fsQCA, using QM, cannot find *I to be sufficient for SUCCESS in the
Stokke case or B to be sufficient for Y in the invented truth table. It seems,
then, that ESA, if it is to rely on these ENCs to vet SAs, finds itself in a dif-
ficult position since, if it makes sense to think about remainders existentially,
this can throw doubt on the validity of the empirical necessity claims that
ESA will use to vet them. To summarize, either configurations missing from
a truth table don’t exist, which allows secure necessity claims to be made on
the basis of the table but renders reference to the remainders and their
assumed outcomes redundant at best; or some might exist, which can threaten
the validity of the necessity claims that ESA wants to use to vet candidate
SAs. It is true, in the Stokke case that if A is necessary for SUCCESS, then
*A should not appear with SUCCESS. But of the 16 possible rows involving
*A, only one is present. In using the ENC to rule out the 15 remainders hav-
ing the outcome SUCCESS, ESA goes beyond the available evidence. It does
this algorithmically rather than on the basis of theoretical reflection. Can we
really be sure that advice from a regime’s own scientists (A) would be needed
for SUCCESS in all conceivable cases?
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The invented truth table allowed us to see the problem in its simplest
form. In that case, ESA itself ruled out the existence of any remainders.
Here there could be no coherent, tenable SAs. Without access to these, ESA
employing fsQCA, and therefore constrained to use the QM algorithm,
could not generate the solution that the ENCs present in the table logically
required. Baumgartner’s CNA, employing its alternative minimization
algorithm, and making no reference to SAs at all, could deliver the required
solution. FsQCA, asked to generate a parsimonious solution, could also
generate the required solution but needed to use contradictory SAs.
We do not want to recommend best practice rules. As we argued earlier,
such recommendations, at this stage of the development of set theoretic
methods, seem premature. With that proviso in mind, it seems to us that
faced with limitedly diverse truth tables, there are several routes that use-
fully might be followed. However, the researcher needs first to make a deci-
sion about the missing truth table rows. (1) Are they missing in the sense
that some at least could exist in principle but happen to be without data
in the truth table at hand? or (2) are there good logical or theoretical reasons
for thinking that data for these rows aren’t to be found?
If (2) were to be the case, then there would seem to be an argument for
analyzing the given truth table as it is (i.e., without using any SAs). In
Ragin’s terms, this would provide a complex solution. However, Baumgart-
ner (2015) has argued that, if set theoretic analysis is to make causal claims
about conditions as difference makers, then only the parsimonious solution
of such a table can offer correct solutions. Such parsimonious solutions can
usually be provided by fsQCA’s standard analysis, although truth tables
involving causal chains can cause problems (Baumgartner 2012, 2015) and,
sometimes, fsQCA’s parsimonious solutions will include contradictory
SAs. The alternative algorithm to QM embedded in Baumgartner’s CNA
can produce these parsimonious solutions without any reference to SAs.
If (1) seems to be the case, but it is not possible to access data for the
missing rows deemed to be possible, then Ragin’s (2008) arguments for the
use of counterfactuals can be turned to. If we aim to analyze a complete
empirical table but lack data on some ‘‘possible’’ rows, then, if only to
explore the effect of various counterfactual outcomes on the solution, we
might run the analysis on the table but expanded by SAs derived by theore-
tically informed counterfactual reasoning. Such reasoning, of course, will
only be as strong—or as weak—as the theories relied on.
Our QCA work has often used large N data sets (Cooper 2005; Cooper
and Glaesser 2011a, 2012b; Glaesser and Cooper 2011, 2012, 2014). Here,
case knowledge may be lacking and existing theory will be prioritized in
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any counterfactual reasoning in the face of limited diversity. On the other
hand, in some small n settings, existing theory may be in short supply and
case knowledge will be prioritized. FsQCA’s standard analysis will prove
useful in exploring the effects of counterfactual reasoning of both sorts.
In addition, if the analyst wishes to include a remainder that is omitted
by standard analysis’s parsimonious solution, this can easily be added after
theoretical reflection on the full range of truth table rows, as also recom-
mended by Schneider and Wagemann (2012).
The lesson of this article, however, seems to be that we should analyze
this new expanded table as if it were a completed table (i.e., without allow-
ing computer algorithms to add any further SAs, however they are vetted).
Going beyond the data to fill in remainders via SAs has been shown, both
for Stokke’s data and for our invented truth table, to be a risky approach.
The underlying problem with ESA is perhaps the application of logic to
derive conclusions from premises whose own status, because of limited
diversity, is insecure.
On the basis of the work reported here, we suggest that two issues con-
cerning set theoretic analysis that currently require more discussion are
(1) whether the QM algorithm, developed to reduce costs in circuit design,
should now be replaced by the alternative instantiated in CNA and (2) the
relative merits of parsimonious versus intermediate solutions, especially
for those who see Boolean analyses as a part or the whole of a procedure
for causal, rather than descriptive, analysis (Baumgartner 2015). Our dis-
cussion here will hopefully comprise a useful contribution. We have
shown that ESA, used in conjunction with QM, generates problems. ESA,
of course, was intended to help resolve problems that QM, given limited
diversity, generates. Our discussion shows this to be more difficult than
perhaps thought. Avoiding QM, rather than attempting to mitigate its
downside via a set of contradiction avoidance strategies, may be benefi-
cial. We suspect that, given a considerable degree of limited diversity,
ESA, in conjunction with QM, will often cause the sort of problems we
report here. The ‘‘coherence’’ in the use of SAs Schneider and Wagemann
seek may often be impossible to achieve while QM’s one-difference
approach to minimization is employed. Without QM, the rules offered
by ESA may no longer be required.
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